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Optimal Monetary Policy in an Open Economy
ABSTRACT
This paper analyzes the optimal intertemporal tradeoff between
inflation and output in an open economy under perfect foresight. The
announcement of the optimal plan may, or may not, generate an initial
jump in the exchange rate. That depends upon the real adjustment
costs, which such unanticipated changes impose on the economy. In the
case that such jumps occur, the question of time consistency of the
optimal policy arises. A time consistent solution is obtained pro-
vided:(1) the policy maker is not too myopic; (ii) the adjustment
costs associated with the jump in the exchange rate are of an appro-
priate form. The optimal monetary rule is derived and properties of
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The tradeoff between unemployment and inflation has been a
dominant issue in macroeconomic policy for many years now. The ques-
tion of the optimal choice has been investigated by a number of authors.
The earliest studies, conducted in the mid 1960's were purely static;
see, e.g., Lipsey (1965) and Brechling (1968). Subsequently, the
analysis was extended to a dynamic context, where the source of the
dynamics is inflationary expectations, which are assumed to follow
some gradual evolutionary process, such as an adaptive scheme; see,
e.g., Phelps (1967, 1974), Turnovsky (1981). These authors derive
an optimal path along which the inflation rate adjusts gradually towards
some steady state equilibrium, while the unemployment rate converges
slowly towards its natural rate level. More recently, Stemp and Turnovsky
(1984) have shown that if instead, inflationary expectations satisfy
perfect foresight, the economy can jump instantaneously to a zero rate
of inflation. However, there is a tradeoff between an initial once—and—
for—all jump in the price level and the subsequent gradual adjustment
of the unemployment rate towards its natural rate level.
In this paper we analyze the issue of the unemployment (or
equivalently output)—inflation tradeoff in an open economy in which
expectations satisfy perfect foresight)' For the model we analyze,
we find that even under this assumption, the optimal paths followed
by output and inflation generally involve the gradual adjustment of
both variables towards their respective steady state equilibria.
There is therefore a dynamic intertemporal tradeoff between them.
The nature of the tradeoff depends critically upon the parameters—2--
characterizing the economy, as well as the preferences of the policy
maker. These include in particular the rate of time discount and the
costs associated with an initial real structural adjustment in the
economy, necessary to attain the optimal path. The implied optimal
monetary policy along this path can be described in terms of monetary
rules, which can be expressed in various equivalent ways. One particu—
larly convenient form specifies the level of the real money stock,
relative to its equilibrium, in terms of the deviation of the current
real exchange rate from its long—run equilibrium level. Rules of this
kind are similar to those which appear in the recent literature on
exchange market intervention; see, e.g., Boyer (1978), Cox (1980),
Turnovsky (1983), and the papers in Bhandari (1985).
An important, and widely discussed, aspect of optimal policy
determination under rational expectations concerns the question of the
time consistency of the optimal policy; see, e.g., Kydland and Prescott
(1977), Turnovsky and Brock (1980). This issue is addressed in our
analysis.-1 We show that, provided the policy maker is not too myopic,
the time consistency or otherwise of the opimal solutions depends cru-
cIally upon the nature of the adjustment costs associated with unanticipated
changes in the exchange rate, resulting from a policy change.
2. A DYNAMIC MACRO MODEL OF A SMALL OPEN ECONOMY
Consider a small open economy operating under a regime of
perfectly flexible exchange rates. The economy is assumed to be
specialized in the production of a single (composite) commodity, part
of which is consumed domestically, the remainder of which is exported.—3—
In exchange, the economy imports from abroad, taking the foreign currency
price of imports as given. We also assume that there exists a perfect
worldwide capital market with domestic and foreign securities being
regarded as perfect substitutes. For notational simplicity, the model
is expressed relative to a fixed steady state, so that all variables













Y =realoutput, measured as a deviation from its
natural rate level,
P =priceof domestic output, expressed in logarithms,
C =consumerprice index, expressed in logarithms,
E =exchangerate (measured in terms of units of foreign
currency per unit of domestic currency), measured
in logarithms,
I =nominalinterest rate,
M =nominalmoney supply, expressed in logarithms.
This model will be immediately recognized as being a standard
Dornbusch (1976) model, so that our description can be brief. Equation—4-.
(la) describes thereducedform for the domestic goods market, where
the demand for domestic output depends positively upon the relative
price of domestic to foreign goods (where for convenience the foreign
currency price of the latter are set to unity) and negatively upon the
real interest rate. Money market equilibrium is specified by (lb) and
is standard. Uncovered interest parity is described by (ic), where
again for notational convenience we have set the foreign nominal
interest rate to zero. Equation (id) defines the rate of price adjust-
ment in the domestic economy in terms of a simple Phillips curve.
Finally, (le) describes the domestic CPI (which we assume to be relevant
to the policy maker's objective function, discussed below), to be a
weighted average of the price ot domestic good and the domesLic price
of the imported good. Note that the real interest rate in (la) and
the nominal money stock in (lb) are deflated by the price of domestic
output. Little is changed, apart from additional notational complica-
tions, if the deflator is in terms of the domestic CPI.
Equations (la)—(le) describe the basic dynamic structure of
the economy, which is seen to be extremely simple. In addition, we
should note that the model embodies the familiar features of the Dornbusch
model, namely sluggish goods prices, so that at any point of time P is
predetermined by the past, while the exchange rate is forward looking,
allowing it to undergo endogenous jumps as new information impinges
on the economy. The policy maker is assumed to control the economy by
appropriate choice of the nominal money stock. In addition, the announce--
ment of a new (optimal) policy at the beginning of the planning horizon,—5—
time 0 say, leads to an initial jump in the exchange rate, which also
plays an important role in determining the subsequent path of the
economy.
The most critical aspect of the model concerns the formula-
tion of the objective function. Specifically, we assume that the
policy maker's objective is to
Minimize kIE(0) — +J IaY + (l_a)Ô21e_13tdt (2)
This cost function has two components. The second is a standard
quadratic loss function. It asserts that a zero rate of inflation of
the CPI (i.e., a stable CPI), together with a full employment level
of output (Y = 0), are regarded as globally optimal. The policy maker
seeks to minimize the discounted intertemporal deviations about these
targets, over the planning horizon, which we take to be infinite.
The parameter a (0 <a<1)reflects the relative importance attached
to inflation and output in the intertemuoral objective. As a increases,
the policy maker is concerned increasingly with unemployment (output);
as a decreases, the objective is weighted more heavily towards inflation.
The parameter 13, (0 <13<c)which measures the rate of time preference,
reflects the degree of myopia of the policy maker; the larger 13, the
more myopic he is.
As noted above, with a forward looking exchange rate, the
change in monetary policy at time zero will cause the exchange rate
to undergo an initial unanticipated discontinuous change from its pre-
viously inherited level E0 say, at that time. Given that the price of
output is predetermined at any instant, this change in the nominal—6—
exchange rate translates into an instantaneous unanticipated jump in
the relative price E —P,which in turn causes an unanticipated jump
in output. These jumps in real magnitudes impose real (structural)
adjustment costs on the economy and these need to be taken into account
in assessing the overall benefits of the optimal stabilization policy
to the economy.
The initial adjustment costs are specified to be proportional
to the absolute value of the jump, raised to the arbitrary power q.--"
This is a more general functional form than the more usual quadratic
function appearing in the second component in (2), but the choice is
deliberate. As will be shown below, the time consistency or otherwise
of the optimal policy depends critically upon q. Specifically, if
q <I,the solution is time consistent; for q >1it is time incon-
sistent. Thus the quadratic function (q =2)is time inconsistent,
while if the initial costs are evaluated in terms of the absolute jumps
(q =1),time consistency is obtained.
The magnitude of the initial jump in the exchange rate will be
shown to depend upon the size of the coefficient k. In the limiting
case when k =0,we will see that the optimal monetary policy will move
the economy instantaneously to steady state. The dynamic time path there-
fore degenerates. Thus, a well—defined optimal intertemporal adjustment
path is obtained by, in effect, balancing off the initial costs associated
with implementing the policy, with the subsequent improvement in the
performance of the economy. This procedure for generating a gradual
adjustment process is not new. In his well known survey article on
distributed lags, Griliches (1967) demonstrated how distributed lag— 7.—
investment functions could be derived by balancing off the costs of an
initial adjustment in the capital stock) with the costs of beingaway
from some target level. Our approach here is essentially analogous.
3. THE OPTIMAL MONETARY POLICY PROBLEM
The formal monetary stabilization problem is to choose the
nominal money stock M(t) so as to minimize the loss function specified
in (2) subject to the constraints on the economy given by (1). In order
to solve this problem it is convenient to define:
m EM—P=realmoney stock (in logarithms),
SE —P=relativeprice of foreign to domestic
goods (in logarithms); i.e., the real
exchange rate.
We can then use equations (1) to express the variables Y, C, and s, in




















We shall assume 1 >day,thereby ensuring D >0.This imposes an upper
bound on the speed of price adjustment y consistent with having a down-
ward sloped IS curve in Y —Ispace.
Given the assumption that price of output moves gradually, it is
reasonable to assume that P(t) is observed at time t. Thus by continuously
accommodating the nominal money stock (the monetary instrument) to the pre-
determined price level, the monetary authorities can in effect control the
real money stock m. In fact, it is analytically convenient to treat m rather
than M as being the monetary control variable. Secondly, we assume that the
monetary authority observes the nominal exchange rate instantaneously. Thus
the relative price 8(t) is observable to the policy maker at time t, and in
factthe optimal monetary policies will be obtained as feedback solutions in
terms of s.-' Thus the formal optimal stabilization problem is
Minimize ks(O) - + [aY + (l_a)2]etdt (4)
subject to (3a)—(3c).
Since the function describing the adjustment costs associated
with the initial jump in the real exchange rate, i.e., kjs(0) —s
is generally nondifferentiable at the point s(0) =s0,the optimization
problem specified by equations (3a)—(3c), (4) can most easily be solved
by decomposing it into the following two subproblems:
Problem 1:
Find L1 =Mmk(s(0) —80)q+ J [aY2 + (l_a)C!2Jetdt (5a)
subject to equations (3a)—(3c) and s(0) >s0—9--
Problem 2:
Find L2 =Mmk(s0 —5(0))q+
J[aY2 + (l_a)2]etdt (5b)
subject to equations (3a)—(3c) and s0 >s(O)
The solution to the original nroblem is then a solution for which
s(O) >sis L1 <Lor a solution for which s0 >s(O)if L2 <L1.
4. DETERMINATION OF OPTIMALITY CONDITIONS
To solve the optimization problem specified by both Problems
1 and 2, we first write down the Hamiltonian function:





where let is the discounted Lagrange multiplier associated with the
dynamic equation (3c). The Euler equations with respect to m and s
are then given by
+
p12s
— = 0 (7a)




These two equations, in conjunction with equations (3a)—(3c), then
define the dynamic time paths for the optimal solutions for m and s,
and hence for Y and C.—10—
Note further that the long—run solution is obtained by setting
s =p=0in (7a), (7b). From this substitution we immediately see that
in long—run equilibrium m =s=0.Consequently, the long—run dynamic
time path of the economy converges to Y =C=0.
In addition, the optimal solution must satisfy the following
transversality condition as t
—st limspe 0 (8)
Furthermore, the fact that s(0) is endogenously determined imposes the




then p(O) =kq(s(0)-5)q—1 (9a)
If s(0) =s0then p(O)kq(s(0) -)q.l (9b)
For Problem 2:
If s0 >s(0)then p(0) =—kq(s0
—(0flq—l (lOa)
If =s(0)then p(O) >—kq(s0
—g(Q))1 (lOb)
5. TRANSITIONAL DYNANICS
The main item of interest is the transitional dynamics implied
by the optimal solutions (7a), (7b), together with (3a)—(3c). We begin
by solving (7a) for m, namely,
l2
(11)—l 1-
Next, substituting for in from (11) into (7b) and (3c) thedynamic solution






























K <0,if either h22 <0
or if h22 >0,and <(h2+ h12h21)/h22 (14a)
K >0,if h22 >0and>(h2+
h12h21)/h22 (14b)—12—










Also, A20 according as K0. Hence it follows from (l4a, l4b) that
A2<O,if01313
(17a)






In other words, the optimal solution will have two unstable
roots if the policy maker is sufficiently myopic (i.e., 13 is sufficiently
large); otherwise, the optimal solution will have one stable and one
unstable root. The critical level of myopia, 13*, depends upon the
parameters in the economy.







where n1 and n2 are arbitrary constants. Given (16a), (16b), in order
for the transversality conditions (8) to hold, we require n1 =0
and hence the solution becomes




wherep(O) satisfies the initial conditions given by equations (9), (10)
and ,sdenote optimal values.
It will be recalled from the previous discussion that if the
policy maker is sufficiently myopic (i.e., ifis sufficiently large)
then 0 < </2,and the path derived from the optimality conditions
is unstable. This is a plausible outcome, because when the policy maker
is myopic much more weight is assigned to initial values along the optimal
path. In the extreme case when> *, thepolicy maker is so unconcerned
with these later values that it is of little consequence for the loss func-
tion that the optimal path diverges.
When the optimal path diverges, then given that an optimal path
has been chosen at time 0, say, it will always be optimal to revise the
initial path at some future time tto say. This property of the optimal
solution, which is known as time inconsistency, is clearly undesirable.
In fact it can be argued that if all solutions to the optimization problem
are time inconsistent, then no truly optimal solution willexist.-'—14-
Throughout the rest of this paper we shall restrict analysis to the
case where the optimal path converges (i.e., A2 <0).As will be
shown in the next section, for a large range of cases, such a path
is consistent with a time—path that would be chosen at any time in
the future, and hence is time consistent.
Equations (19a), (19b) describe the time path of the real
exchange rate, s, and the costate variable, ,alongthe optimal path
that will be followed after an initial jump in the exchange rate. Com-
bining (l9b) with (11), and noting the definitions of h.., the real
money stock along the optimal path is related to the real exchange
rate by the simple feedback rule
m(t) =
8 s(t) t>0 (20)
1
Rules of the form (20) characterize much of the current discussion of
exchange market intervention; see Boyer (1978), Cox (1980), Turnovsky
(1983) and papers in Bhandari (1985). Since 81 <0,and assuming the
more plausible case where A2 <0, >0,we see that the coefficient
of Sin(20) is positive. This means that following the initial jump
in the exchange rate, it will be optimal for the policy maker to respond
to a depreciating real exchange rate by increasing the real money supply;
i.e., to lean with the wind." Note that by using the definitions of m




In a similar fashion we can express the optimal time paths
followed by output and inflation in terms of the time path followed by
the real exchange rate. These are derived by substituting (20) and
(19b) into (3a), (3b), respectively, to yield1
lA2+0l282l Y(t) = s(t)1s(t) (21a)
1
t>0
• n1A2+81n282n1 C(t) = (t)w2s(t) (21b)
I
Recalling the definitions of p,81,we find l2 —2l
<0.
Thus for A2 <0,the coefficient >0.That is, along the optimal path
domestic output increases with the real exchange rate. On the other hand,
in (21b) is ambiguous. Differentiating (le) with respect to tand
noting the definition of s, we may express (21b) as
=P+ (l—6)
=[yw+ (l—6)X2J (21b')
enabling us to see the source of the ambiguity. On the one hand, C
responds positively through the inflation of domestic goods to domestic
output and hence to the relative price s; on the other hand, it is
negatively related through changes in Stos. The net effect depends
upon which of these two effects dominate.
Combining equations (21a), (21b), we observe that the optimal




12_ 2 1 Y(t) Y(t) (22) 2 l2 2l—16—
It is clear from the above observations that this locus may be either
positively or negatively sloped depending upon whether 0. Finally,
substituting (20) into (3c) and noting (2la), (21b), we see that along
the optimal path all variables converge at tne same rate to their
respective steady states.
6.ENDOGENOUS INITIAL JUMPSIN EXCHANGE RATh
davingdetermined the dynamic time pathof the economy follow-
ing the initial jumpin the exchange rate, all thatremains to determine
the solution for the optimal time path is to determine the initial condi-
tion for the exchange rate, namely, s(0), itself.
By combining the transversality conditions at time 0, given
by equations (9) and (10), together with the optimality conditions (l9a),
(1gb), and the comparison of the loss functions for Problems 1 and 2. we




2Jk((Q) )ql ,ifs(O) >s0 (23a)






2]kq(s 5(0))ql ,if >s(0) (23c)
12
Thenature of the endogenous jumps in the exchange rate depends crucially
upon the form of the adjustment costs as represented in (2'). Specifically,
the time consistency of the initial jump depends upon the magnitude ofq,—17—
while the magnitude of the initial jump depends upon the inherited real
exchange rate s0, together with the cost parameter k.It is convenient
to consider the three cases q =1,0 <q<1,q >1separately.
Case 1:q =1
In this case conditions (23a)—(23c) reduce to
h -X
s(O) =— 2
k ,ifs(0) >s0 (24a)
12
h —X h






It can be deduced from these three equations that if the inherited real
exchange rate s lies in a specific closed interval bounded by
{hii_x2] <s
< (25)
then it will be optimal for no initial jump in the real exchange rate
s to occur.Z' Since any initial jump in the real exchange rate is
achieved through a jump in the nominal rate (P moves continuously through-
out) this means that if (25) holds, it will be optimal for no jump in
the nominal exchange rate to occur. However, ifs0 lies outside this
interval, then the nominal exchange rate will jump so that the real
exchange rate s moves instantaneously to the nearest boundary of this
closed interval.—18—
The boundaries of the closed interval defined in (25) depend
critically upon k, the magnitude of the cost associated with the initial
jump. If k thenit is clear that it is never optimal to have an
initial jump in the exchange rate E. On the other hand, if k -0,then
the closed interval (25) collapses to 0, and it will be optimal for the
real exchange rate to always jump instantaneously to its steady state
equilibrium value, (which we have chosen to be zero). Thirdly, the
boundaries of the closed interval are symmetric about the steady—state
equilibrium level=0.
Once the initial condition for the optimal time path for the
real exchange rate s has been determined, equations (19a), (19b) show
that s will then converge monotonically towards its steady state level,
wheneveris sufficiently small to ensure A2<0.Since the steady state
=0is always within the boundaries of the closed interval defined by
(25), it will not be optimal for the exchange rate to jump again after
the initial jump. In the case q =1,therefore, the optimal policy will
clearly be time consistent.
This example of a time consistent solution is illustrated in
Figure la. Initially, the real exchange rate is at s0 <—(h11—X2)k/h12.
At the initial instant that optimization begins, the jump in the nominal
exchange rate causes the real exchange rate to jump to s(O) =
andthereafter it begins to converge monotonically towards equilibrium
(zero).
Case 2: 0< q <1
Enthiscase condition (23b) reduces to
=s(O)< (23b')—19—
Thus if s0 <0,then either s(0) satisfies (23a) or s(0) = Asin
the case q =1,it may be optimal either for an initial jump in s to
occur, or for no initial jump in s to occur, depending upon the
inherited value of the exchange rate, as well as the adjustment cost
parameters k and q, and other parameters in the economy. Note that
in contrast to the case q =1,where the point to which s(0) jumps
(when it is in fact optimal to jump) is independent of the inherited
value s0 (see (24a) or (24b)), in the present case s(0) is in part
determined by s0; see (23a), (23b). It can further be shown that no
subsequent jumps beyond the initial point will be optimal, although
details of this are omitted.' Thus for 0 <q<1,the solution will
be time consistent and the optimal patti will be of the same general
form to that for q =1;i.e., a possible initial jump followed by con-
vergence towards equilibrium.
Case 3: q >1
In this case inequalities (23b) reduce to
s0
=s(0)=0 (23b")
If s0] >0,then (23a), (23c) together imply-'
Isol
>Is(O)J>0 (26a)
But then if after the initial jump, the policy maker immediately
reoptimizes, choosing the initial condition after the second optimiza-
tion to be given by s(0+),then
>s(0)j>s(0+)j>0 (26b)—20—
Hence s(O+)s(O), unless s0 =0.Thus, when q >1,the recomputed
path is in general discontinuous and the optimal solution is in general
time inconsistent.
An example of this time inconsistent case is given in Figure
lb. At the beginning of the optimization period, the real exchange rate
s jumps from s to s(0). If the policy maker reoptimizes at time to,
then it will be optimal for the exchange rate to jump again at that time.
An intuitive explanation of these results can be seen by noting
that the marginal cost of a jump in the exchange rate is given by
kqs(O) - q—l
When0<q<1,the marginal cost of a jump decreases with the magnitude
of the jump. Thus it is "cheaper" to have one large jump than two small
ones. On the other hand, when q >1,the marginal cost of a jump
increases with the magnitude of the jump. In this case two smaller jumps
are less costly than a single large one'
7. SOLUTION FOR OPTIMAL TIME PATH
We are now in a position to construct the optimal time paths
for output and inflation. This involves a consideration of the optimal
transitional paths given in (19a,l9b), (20), and (2la,2lb), as well as
the endogenous initial jumps in the exchange rate described in Section 6.
Throughout this section we shall restrict discussion to time consistent
solutions. We shall also consider the case q =1,for which s(O) when
it jumps, does so to a point independent of s0. The case q <1is essen-
tially similar, the only difference being that s(O) is a function of s0,
as seen from (23a).—21—
We assume that initially the economy starts from a point hav-
ing an arbitrary real money stock m0 and real exchange rate s0. Corre-




For the sake of being concrete we shall assume thatm0, s0, the inherited
values, have been chosen such that < 0, C0 > 0; i.e., the economy
begins in a state of stagflation.
Typical optimal paths for inflation and output are illustrated
in Figures 2A, 2B. In both these figures, the locus XX' defines the
optimal adjustment path for output and CPI inflation described by equa-
tion (22). It has been drawn on the assumption that the domestic price
inflation responds slowly to output changes (i.e., y is small), so that
the coefficient in (2lb) is negative. This implies that XX' has a
negative slope. Given our choice of units, the steady state of the
economy is at the point where this line passes through the origin.
The appropriate initial points on the line XX' lie within
the closed interval defined by AB. In effect, this locus is the analogue
of the closed set derived from (23b) in Y—C space. Within this set no
initial jump in E (or s) occurs. If the economy starts outside this set
it must move towards the nearer endpoint A or B. The coordinates of
these points are obtained by substituting for (0) from the initial
conditions (9), (10) into (19) and (21), at time t =0.—22—
The loci Z1Z, Z2Z (as well as WS,W'S') haveslopes given
by
dC = (27)
where the partial derivatives ,n,are obtained from (3a), (3b)
Basically, these derivatives define the slopes of the lines along
which inflation and output will move instantaneously in response to
an initial change in the money supply, without taking account of the
jump in E which such a change may or may not induce (depending upon
adjustment costs). Since l >0,its slope depends upon whether
>
111<
It is seen from its definition that r, has two effects. On
4-
theone hand, an increase in m will raise output, thereby increasing
the rate of inflation of domestic goods and hence that of the overall
CPI. On the other hands the monetary expansion will tend to lower the
domestic interest rate and hence the rate of exchange depreciation,
thereby lowering the rate of inflation of the CPI. We take the case
where the latter effect dominates, so that the Z.Z lines are negatively
11/ H
sloped.
Figure 2 illustrates two cases. The first is where the initial
output and inflation rate lie at a point such as V which lies outside
the area defined by Z1Z and Z2Z. The second is where it is initially
at W, which lies within the area. We shall consider these in turn.
Suppose that the economy is initially at V, with <0and a
positive rate of inflation C0 >0.The initial adjustment involves mov-
ing the system instantaneously to A on the optimal locus XX'. This jump
implies an instantaneous increase in real output (dY(O) >0),accompanied—23—
by an instantaneous reduction in the rate of inflation (d(O) <0).To







Solving these equations for dm(0), ds(0), yields
ri.,dY(O) —cdC(O)
dm(0) =




From the definitions of q., fl.,, we can readily show12 —'2l
>o•
Itthenfollows that with dY(0) >0,dC(0) <0, > > 0
dm(0) >0 (29a)











Thus the movement from V to A is achieved by an initialmonetary
expansion. This gives rise to a depreciation .of the real exchangerate,
which with the price of domestic output sluggish, is brought aboutby a—24—
depreciation of the nominal rate. The expressions for the initial changes











It follows further from (30) that
s0 <s(0)<0 (30a')
m0 <m(0)<0 (30b')
Consequently, the original stagflation illustrated by V is the result of
a low real money supply, coupled with a value of the real exchange rate
which is overvalued compared with its long-run equilibrium value.





This represents the relative effects of an exchange rate change on the
rate of inflation and level of output, with the nominal (and real) money
supply held constant. Thus the instantaneous jump from V to A can be
decomposed into a jump due to the change in the exchange rate (along VI!'),
coupled with a jump due to the monetary expansion (along V'A), both of
which occur simultaneously at the beginning of the optimization.
Letting (dC/dY), denote the slope of the inflation—output
tradeoff given by XX', we can show by substitution that
dC) dC dC >
XX'
> (32)—25—
Figures 2A and 2B are drawn with the respective slopes
satisfying (32).
Despite the initial depreciation of the exchange rateassociated
with the move from V to A, the domesticcurrency remains overvalued rela-
tive to its long—run equilibrium. Further devaluationis required. With
s(0) <0,the monetary authorities set m(0) <0,in accordance with the
optimal rule (20). As a result, the domestic exchange rateimmediately
continues to depreciate; i.e., s(0) =
A2s(0)
>0.This causes output
to continue increasing and with2 <0,for CPI inflation to continue
decreasing. Along the optimal path, the realexchange s continues to
depreciate, although at a decreasing rate, assteady state is approached.
This adjustment is mirrored by themoney supply. Likewise, output and
inflation continue to follow the optimalpath XX' until the stedy—stae
equilibrium Y =C=0is reached.
It is also possible to consider thecase where the domestic
price inflation effect in (2lbT) dominates,so that the coefficient
>0.In this case XX' is positively sloped. Theexposition remains
similar to the above except that after thejump in the exchange rate,
the economy will be driven to a level of deflation(C(0) <0),as well as
unemployment. In this case the effect of themonetary expansion along the
optimal path on output will have a greater effecton domestic prices than
before. The added demand now inducesinflationary pressure leading to a
gradual moderation in the deflation initiallygenerated.
We turn now to the second case illustrated inFigure 2b, where
the economy starts out at W which lies within thearea bounded by Z1Z
and Z2Z. In this case it will be optimal forno initial jump in the
exchange rate to occur and the optimal path will be reachedby means of
an initial expansion in the money supply alone. Inthis case the move—26—
is along WS which involves an increase in output accompanied by a
decrease in inflation. Thereafter, output and inflation follow XXV
as before. Note that it is possible for the increase in outputresult-
ing from the initial monetary expansion to take the economy beyond the
steady state level 0. In this case, the economy will reduce output and
depending upon the magnitude of w2, inf late or deflate along the optimal
path XX'. This is illustrated by the move along W'S' from the initial
point W' in Figure 2b.
Finally, Figure 3 illustrates the implied time pathsfor the
levels of CPI and output (drawn for w2 <0).The relationship between
these paths and those in Figure 2 is self—explanatory.
8. FURTHER DISCUSSION
In this paper we have analyzed the optimal intertemporal trade-
off between inflation and output in an open economy which is characterized
by perfect foresight in the formation of exchange rate expectations. The
announcement of the optimal plan, may or may not, generate an initial
unanticipated jump in the exchange rate. That depends upon the real
adjustment costs, which such unanticipated changes impose on the economy.
In the case that such jumps do occur, the question of time consistency
of the optimal path arises. e have obtained a time consistent solution,
provided: (i) the policy maker is not too myopic; (ii) the adjustment
costs associated with the unanticipated jump in the exchange rate are of
an appropriate, but reasonable, form.
The optimal monetary rule can be expressed in feedback form
with the real money supply being adjusted to the real exchange rate.
In most cases the relationship is a positive one, implying a "leaning
with the wind" policy. The corresponding adjustments in output and—2.7—
inflation can also be expressed in terms of the realexchange rate.
Accordingly, along the optimal path the relationship betweenoutput
and inflation is a linear one. Thismay be either positively or
negatively sloped, depending upon whether the CPI inflation rate is
positively or' negatively related to the real exchange rate.
vehaveanalyzed in some detail the case where theeconomy
starts from stagflation; output is below full employmentequilibrium,
while the inflation rate is positive. In thecase that it is optimal
for the exchange rate to undergo an initialjump, the optimal monetary
policy calls for an initial expansion, thereby generatingan initial
increase in output and in the level of the CPI, followedby an instantaneous
reduction in its rate of inflation. Thereafter,as the economy moves
along the optimal paui, the monetary growth remainspositive, but declin-.
ing, so that output and inflation converge to theirrespective equilibria.
If the costs associated with the initial jump in theexchange rate are
sufficiently high, there will be no initial jump, and theoptimal output—
inflation tradeoff path is reached by means of achange in the money
supply alone. The exchange rate then always movescontinuously.
An important aspect of our analysis concerns thespecification of
the Phillips curve, (ld), in which the price ofoutput adjusts to devia-
tions in output alone. If, on the other hand, theprice adjusts fully to
changes in the CPI, as the result of some wage indexationscheme, say,
our results are changed somewhat. In particular, the stable loci XX'
in Figs 2A, 2B become horizontal, coinciding with the Yaxis, implying
that inflation can be reduced instantaneously tozero. At the same
time, output still adjusts slowly, reflecting the initial adjustment
12/ costs.——28—
A further interesting aspect of our results is the ability to
generate time—consistent solutions.These are obtained by imposing
costs on the initial jumps in the exchange rate and assuming these to
be from a specified class of functions. Such costs are introduced on
the grounds that unanticipated changes in the exchange rateimpose
real disturbances and hence real adjustment costs on the economy.
The feature of the specification which generates time consistency is
the fact that the marginal cost of a jump in the exchange rate
decreases with the size of the jump, thus making it optimal to make
an initial large jump and discouraging any subsequent jumps. By
choosing a general class of adjustment cost functions, we have
demonstrated that the phenomenon of time consistency is not simply
the result of choosing a particular arbitrary cost function.
Furthermore, the procedure used here has general applicability
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1For some simulations of optimal monetary policies in an open economy
see Driffill (1982).
-'The issue of time consistency within the context of linear—quadratic
dynamic control models, with specificreference to problems of inter-
national macro policy, is also discussed by Miller and Salmon(1984).
-'The reason for specifying the costs in terms of the absolute value
is simply to ensure that they are always nonnegativefor all q >0.
ignore informational asymmetries, i.e. the possibilitythat E may
be observed before P or even H.
—-'1This result follows because if the optimal solution is time incon-
sistent, there is no optimal time period between endogenous jumps.
-'Combining (20) with (2la) or (21b) it is also possible to express
the optimal monetary rule in terms of Y or C. However, theseforms
are less appealing since information oncurrent exchangerate is
generally more readily available than information oncurrent output
or inflation.
-'This can be established by the following simple argument. Suppose
lies in the closed interval (25), and s0 jumps to s(O) > say.
Then from (24a), s(0) =—(h11—X2)k1h12.
Hence it follows that
—(h11—X2)k1h12 >s0,
inconsistent with s lying in the closed inter-
val (25). The case where s0 jumps to s(O) <s0can be argued simi-
larly.
-"The detailed arguments are available from the authors on request.
-'Inequality (26a) can be established by contradiction. Suppose s0 >0.
Then either s(O) >s
>0,or s(O) <s0.
If s(O) >s,then (24a)
implies s(O) <0and hence s(O) <s0,
which is a contradiction. Thus
s(0) <s,
in which case (23c) implies o >s(0)>0implying (26a).
The case where s <0can be reasoned similarly.—F2—
'Equivalently, these conclusions followfrom the mathematical property
that for a >0,b >0,
(a + b) > + q >1
q<l
It isimportant to emphasize that n< 0does not necessarily mean
1
that a monetary expansion will necessarily leadto a lower CPI
inflation rate. This is because it measuresonly a partial effect
and does not take account of any induced jump in theexchange rate.
In fact, one can show that an increase in m alonewill (in the
absence of adjustment costs) lead to a devaluation ofthe exchange rate.This devaluation in the exchange rate tends toincrease the
domestic inflation rate P, but as is known from theDornbusch model,
this can lead to a decline in E, the rate ofdepreciation of the
nominal exchange rate. Since C =3P+ (l—ô)E, the overall effect
on the CPI inflation rate is in general ambiguous.
Weare grateful to a referee for drawing this to our attention.
Actually, a previous version of this paper analyzes thecase of an
expectations—augmented Phillips curve in detail.REFERENCES
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